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NOTE
The Effect of White Motor Co. on Exclusive
Selling Arrangements
Exclusive selling arrangements with territorial and customer limita-
tions are increasingly being attacked under the antitrust laws.' In this
note the validity of these arrangements will be discussed in the context
of the recent case of White Motor Co. v. United States.2 In Part I,
White Motor and other general considerations will be discussed. Rele-
vant factors in determining the validity of territorial limitations and
customer limitations will be discussed in Parts II and III, respectively.
I. WHITE MOTOR AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Exclusive selling arrangements, frequently denominated as exclusive
franchises or dealerships, 3 are arrangements whereby the supplier
agrees with the buyer not to sell to other buyers in the same market.
Since these arrangements frequently incorporate territorial restrictions,
customer restrictions, covenants not to compete, or other types of
ancillary restraints,4 the initial question presented to the courts is
whether to analyze and adjust the effects of each individual limiting
feature or to assess the total effect of the manufacturer's entire distri-
bution system. In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,5 the
Supreme Court held that illegal contracts should not be considered
separately but must be considered as "an integral part of the whole
distribution system."6 But in Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission,7 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
1. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Snap-on Tools
Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963)- Sandura Co., TRADE
BEG. REP. (1961-63 Trade Cas.) 11 15945 (FTC 1962); In the Siatter of Dictograph
Prods., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953).
2. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
3. Exclusive selling arrangements take various forms. See Note, Restricted Channels
of Distribution Under the.'Sherman Act, 75 HIav. L. REv. 795, 801-23 (1962).
Exclusive selling arrangements have been characterized as quasi-integration, COLE,
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN MARBIr1MG, Ill. Bureau of Economic
and Business Research Bull. 6, #74 (1952), or as a nonproprietary kind of vertical
integration. DmLAr & KAHN, FAIR ConMl'srrIoN: Trm LAW AND EcoNoNcs OF
ANTITRUST POLICY 173 (1954)..
4. See, e.g., Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 1; Sandura
Co., supra note 1.
5. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
6. Id. at 720.
7. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
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provisions in the dealer agreements must be considered seriatim, not
in their entirety, because no substantial evidence was introduced to
show that the provisions constituted a unitary device to foster anti-
competitive practices.8 However, analysis and adjudication of the
limitations in the context of the entire distribution system is preferable;
otherwise any cumulative effect of the restraints may escape judicial
scrutiny.9 This is especially true in the price fixing cases since price
fixing arrangements often utilize exclusive selling arrangements with
numerous auxiliary provisions.
The question whether an exclusive selling arrangement with terri-
torial and customer limitations is valid necessitates consideration of
three statutes. The arrangement will violate the antitrust laws if: (1)
it constitutes a "restraint of trade" under section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act,10 or (2) the effects of the arrangement "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" within
the meaning of section 3 of the Clayton Act," or (3) it is an "un-
fair method of competition" under the provisions of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.12 Since an exclusive selling arrange-
ment may fall within the ambit of one or more of these statutes, it is
important when analyzing the relevant decisional law to keep in mind
the different statutory standards.'
3
Territorial and customer limitations may be used in conjunction
with a scheme of price fixing arrangements. In United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,14 the Supreme Court held Soft-Lite's
distribution system to be a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act because substantial price fixing was involved. Soft-Lite's distribu-
tion system involved retail outlet licensing, resale price control, con-
tract enforcement by means of inspections, and refusal to sell to license
agreement violators.
Relying on a dictum in Bausch & Lomb, the Justice Department has
viewed the two ancillary restraints involving territorial and cus-
8. Id. at 830. It was argued that the restrictions should be analyzed in toto because
they were all incorporated into one document, but the court rejected this argument.
9. Standing alone a territorial limitation may not be very restrictive. But when it
is considered in conjunction with a covenant not to compete (a customer limitation)
the totality of effect may result in a very restrictive distribution system because the
provisions tend to reinforce one another. See Sandura Co., supra note 1, at 20772-73.
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
11. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
12. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
13. See notes 11, 12 supra, and accompanying text. See generally REPORT or THE
ArromNm' GENEPAiS NATIONAL CownrE To STUDY THE ANnTUsT LAWs 12
(1955); Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cm. L. RBv. 157 (1954); 61 Mica. L. Rrv. 589
(1963).
14. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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tomer limitation, as illegal per se.' 5  After successfully procuring
many consent decrees without judicial review,' 6 the Justice Depart-
ment challenged the legality of White Motor Company's distribution
system.'7 White's selling arrangement granted its distributors and
dealers the exclusive right to sell White products in a specified terri-
tory, restricting the sales of each dealer or distributor to customers
located in his territory. White also reserved certain accounts, desig-
nated as national or fleet accounts, to itself unless specific permission
was granted to sell to these accounts at set prices.' 8 The district court
15. See id. at 721; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing
Legislation of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 362 (1955).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70495 (W.D.N.Y.
1962); United States v. Dempster Bros., 202 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); United
States v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 1960 Trade Cas. if 69882 (E.D. Wis. 1960); United
States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. fr 69207 (D.R.I. 1958); United States v. The
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. f[ 69011 (W.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v.
J. P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. f1 68613 (N.D. Ill. 1957); United States v. Philco
Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68409 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
17. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
18. Paragraph 23 of the Distributor Selling Agreements provided: "Right of Can-
cellation. This agreement and any renewal or extention thereof may be cancelled and
terminated as below provided: (d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (b) and
(c) next preceding, Company may, at its option, cancel and terminate this agreement
at any time without any notice whatsoever to Distributor... in case of breach of this
agreement on the part of Distributor." Id. at 568.
The dealer sales agreement contained the following performance condition: "It is
further understood and agreed that full performance of this agreement by [Type of
Dealer] is a condition precedent to performance thereof by [Company or Distributor]
and that any failure by [Company or Distributor] to enforce or to require performance
by [Type of Dealer] of any provision of this agreement or to exercise any option herein
granted, shall in no way affect the validity of this agreement or impair the right of
[Company or Distributor] later on to enforce any such provision or exercise any such
option." Id. at 569 "Parts Sales to National and Fleet Accounts. Distributor agrees to
extend to firms and corporations, and subsidiaries of the latter, designated by Company
as 'National Accounts' or 'Fleet Accounts' and to Federal and State Governments and
departments and political subdivisions thereof, the same discounts on parts and acces-
sories as authorized and allowed the aforementioned accounts by Company." Id. at
568.
The following provisions were contained in the dealer agreements: "Prices, Discounts
and Terms. [Company or Distributor] agrees to sell to [Type of Dealer] at Company's
factory at Cleveland, Ohio, new White truck standard chassis, including standard
equipment and accessories mounted thereon, for cash in par funds at the respective
prices and subject to the discounts, terms and provisions or at the [Type of Dealer]
net prices and subject to the terms and provisions set forth in [Type of Dealer]
'Price List-Appendix A,' 'rice List-Appendix B,' and the latest issue of Company's
sales handbook, all of which are subject to change without advance notice. The 'Price
List-Appendix A' and 'Price List-Appendix B,' will be issued by Company from
time to time and the latest issue thereof shall become and be a part of this agreement."
.. .. Part Sales to National and Fleet Accounts. [Type of Dealer] agrees to extend
to firms and corporations, and subsidiaries of the latter, designated by The White Motor
Company as 'National Accounts' or 'Fleet Accounts,' and to the Federal and State
Governments and departments and political subdivisions thereof, the same discounts on
parts and accessories as authorized and allowed them by The White Motor Company."
1964]
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accepted the government's contention of illegality per se and held that
White's exclusive selling arrangement with territorial and customer
limitations violated sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.19
Reversing, the Supreme Court held that vertical territorial and
customer limitations are not illegal per se; their validity can be
determined only after a full trial. 20
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated: "This is the first
case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and
we know too little of the actual impact of both that restriction and the
one respecting customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of
the documentary evidence before us."21 On retrial, it will be necessary
for the Court to consider if the price fixing bar of Bausch & Lomb ap-
plies&2 Assuming it will not, White's territorial limitations must be
examined in light of existing decisions in the area, including those
involving horizontal territorial division.
II. TERRIToIAL LnMTATiONs
When competitors agree not to compete in specified territories, the
consequence is to reduce the number of sellers in each affected market;
this in turn necessarily reduces competition if the agreeing competitors
possess substantial or dominant market power.23 Such agreements,
therefore, are traditionally illegal per se.24
Whether the cases involving horizontal division of market, e.g., Tim-
ken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,5 extend to a vertical arrange-
ment by one manufacturer which restricts his dealers' or distributors'
territories is a question not free from doubt. The majority in White
Motor expressed no opinion on this question.2 Justice Brennan,
concurring, addressed himself to this question and proposed the
"Part Sales and Discounts. [Company or Distributor] will sell to [Type of Dealer]
new White parts and accessories listed in the latest revised parts books of the White
Motor Company at the prices and discounts and on the terms and conditions as
provided in the aforementioned 'Price List-Appendix A,' and (or) 'Price List-Appendix
B."' Id. at 568-69.
19. United States v. White Motor Co., supra note 17.
20. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
21. Id. at 261.
22. The majority left open the question whether price fixing was an integral part
of Whites distribution system and within the bar of Bausch & Lomb. Id. at 260.
23. REPORT OF a ATToInNEY GENEmAaL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ThE
ANrrmusT LAws 26 (1955).
24. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See United
States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), af#'d, 332 U.S. 319
(1947); Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
25. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
26. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 2,53, 261 (1963).
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following test: "The crucial question [is] whether, despite the differ-
ences in form, these restraints serve the same pernicious purposes and
have the same inhibitory effects upon competition as horizontal di-
visions of markets....,27
Although horizontal division of markets by competitors and a
vertical arrangement (exclusive selling arrangement with territorial
limitations) by one manufacturer restricting dealers' or distributors'
territories may have some similarity in form, they are essentially dif-
ferent. Agreements for horizontal division of a market, if successful,
will directly eliminate competitors or inhibit entry into the market.
Although it will eliminate competition between a manufacturer's own
retail outlets, a vertical exclusive selling arrangement with territorial
limitations at the retail level will not directly eliminate a competing
manufacturer. It may, however, indirectly affect the competitor if
his distribution system cannot acquire outlets equivalent to those of
the manufacturer employing the territorial limitations. If the terri-
torial limitations thus restrict entry into the market by the second
seller, competition is inhibited.
No economic justifications will save horizontal division of markets.
On the other hand, economic considerations may be offered to justify
the use of an exclusive selling arrangement with territorial limita-
tions.2 For example, a new manufacturer attempting to enter the
market may have a legitimate interest in attracting market outlets
(dealers) by employing an exclusive selling arrangement with terri-
torial limitations. Also it may be economically necessary for a
manufacturer to use this arrangement in order to retain a valuable
market outlet.2 Thus, competition may actually increase rather than
decrease.
Territorial limitations may have varying effects on competition
depending on the type of limitation employed.30 Basically there are
27. Id. at 267-68.
28. When a product is going through the early stages of formulating good will,
investing in it may require a substantial sum, yet the risk of consumer acceptance is
great; thus the distributor or dealer may demand a great deal of security before he will
undertake the risk. Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the
Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 286, 312 (1962). Some commentators agree with
Prof. Handler that territorial security clauses and vertical assignments of the channels of
trade through which goods may be marketed enable the supplies to more effectively
compete with other products and are in the interest of orderly marketing. It is sug-
gested that "enforcement policy may be attempting to outlaw some of the acts by
which competing is done, and upon which enforcement self-restraint should have been
exercised." Kaapcke, How to Distribute Your Products, 1962 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'xs
ANsrrruvT LAw SYasosrum 55, 59.
29. See Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws,
9 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 111, 136 (1962).
30. See Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-A
Reappraisal, 40 N.C.L. Rxv. 223 (1961).
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three types of such limitations: (1) Exclusive Selling.31 The manu-
facturer assigns the dealer an exclusive area and agrees not to sell to
another outlet in this area. This arrangement does not preclude the
dealer from selling in other areas; it only restricts the number of
dealers in a particular area. (2) Closed Territory.3 Under this ar-
rangement the dealer is prohibited from soliciting or selling in other
areas, yet is allowed to deal with anyone coming into his area. This
arrangement, unlike an exclusive selling agreement, eliminates intra-
brand competition within a closed territory, but it permits intra-brand
competition between closed territories. (3) Geographical Customer Al-
location.33 Each distributor is prohibited from selling to customers not
residing within his assigned area. Provisions usually are made for
cross-over profits and franchise cancellation; thus intra-brand competi-
tion is eliminated and consumers' choice in selecting their dealer is
restricted.
Because territorial limitations have differing competitive effects and
may have valid commercial bases without necessarily generating anti-
competitive effects, it would seem unwise to ban all such arrangements
under an illegal per se rule.m Assuming that the horizontal division-of-
market cases do not extend to exclusive selling arrangements with
territorial limitations, the only decision bearing on such arrangements
other than White Motor is Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commissionr (decided subsequent to White Motor), although sev-
eral pre-White decisions considered the problem where express terri-
torial limitations were not present.
White Motor Co. employed a geographical customer allocation sys-
tem and attempted to justify its use on the grounds that the territorial
limitation was necessary to enable White to compete effectively with
other large truck manufacturers. Because of inadequate financial re-
sources, White could not utilize direct selling arrangements and had to
rely on a dealership system. An effective dealership system requires
that dealers make vigorous and intensive efforts to develop their
respective territories. If a dealer is to be responsible to the manu-
facturer for energetic performance, White argued, it is fair, reasonable,
and necessary to protect his territory from invasion by other White
31. Id. at 226.
32. Id. at 227.
33. ibid.
34. Territorial restrictions should not be deemed illegal per se but rather should be
governed by the rule of reason. "I submit further, that the Government's Ver se
approach to this problem may have the ultimate effect of inhibiting competition by
small business and thereby subvert one important purpose of the antitrust laws." Lewis,
Orderly Marketing and the Small Business Man, 16 ABA SECTON O0F ANrntsT
LAw, Ihocmmncs 73, 80 (1960).
35. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
36. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1963).
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dealers. Furthermore, to maximize sales, it is necessary for White to
deter intra-dealer rivalry and encourage its dealers to compete with
those of competitors.
The majority, mentioning the "rule of reason"37 and quoting the un-
due restraint test set forth in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v.
United States,3 expressed no opinion on the validity of White's ar-
rangement. Justice Brennan, concurring, suggested three inquiries
necessary to determine the validity of White's system. 9 First. Is there
any merit in the manufacturer's alleged economic justification for use
of the limitations? Second. Assuming the limitation is justified, is its
operation "reasonably related to the need which brought them into
being"--i.e., is the restraint "more restrictive than necessary, or ex-
cessively anticompetitive, when viewed in light of the extenuating
interests"? Third. Are less restrictive alternatives available?
Professor Milton Handler believes that once economic justification,
is shown for the territorial restraint, it should not be incumbent on
the manufacturer to prove that some less restrictive alternative could
have been used.40 "Such a requirement would be wholly impractical
from both the legal and business points of view."41 It is quite easy to
look back and ascertain the effect of the alternatives; it is another
matter to predict the competitive effect of numerous alternatives with
the "penalty" for the wrong guess being governmental intervention.
Subsequent to White Motor, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,2 sustained Snap-
On's exclusive selling arrangement, which involved retail price, terri-
torial and customer limitations, and what was in effect a covenant not
to compete. Snap-On, a large hand tool manufacturer, had an express
geographical territorial limitation, which, because of nonenforcement,
was essentially a closed territorial system.
In sustaining this system under section 3 of the Clayton Act, the
37. Id. at 261.
38. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and
to predict consequences." Id. at 238.
39. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268-71 (1963).
40. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 167 (1963).
41. Id. at 167.
42. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
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court applied Justice Brennan's suggested test. First. The territorial re-
straint was economically justified and "not significantly anti-competi-
five." The hand tool service industry required a continuous customer
relationship with the mechanic-consumer, who expected regular and
frequent calls at his place of business. If this relationship was not
established and maintained, the mechanic would transact business
with other firms. To accomplish this, it was necessary for the manu-
facturer either to have a large sales force of his own or to utilize
an exclusive selling arrangement with customer limitations.4 Second.
Snap-On's need for its distribution system was reasonably related to
the system's operation. Snap-On was not a "manufacturer in a mono-
polistic position vis-a-vis its inter-brand competitors."4 Evidence indi-
cated that the eighty competitors in the hand tool industry engaged
in "bitter and bloody" competition.45 In the court's view, Snap-On's
survival required these arrangements. Third. Requiring Snap-On to
rewrite its dealer's agreements by assigning each dealer a "primary
zone of influence" is a futile gesture.46 Snap-On's system in effect
accomplishes the same thing because dealers are allowed to sell to
anyone coming into their area seeking their services.47
The Snap-On decision comports with the standards evolved in the
pre-White cases applying the ancillary restraint doctrine and uphold-
ing the assignment of exclusive territories to distributors.48 In Schwing
Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.4 9 and Packard Motor Car Co. V.
Webster Motor Car Co.,50 geographical limitations through the use of
exclusive automobile dealerships (without express territorial limita-
tions) were sustained. One commentator suggests that the Schwing
and Packard cases illustrate that a manufacturer may grant exclusive
selling rights to retain a valuable dealer.5' Specifically, they recognize
"that a dealer may demand insulation from competition as the price
of continuing a customer."
5 2
Since the criteria of "unfair method of competition" under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act are amorphous, section 5 is fre-
43. Id. at 832-33.
44. Id. at 833.
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 832.
47. Ibid.
48. See, e.g., Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943);
Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied,
192 U.S. 606 (1904).
49. 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd on opinion below, 239 F.2d 176 (4th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
50. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).




quently utilized by the government to prevent a manufacturer's ques-
tionable practice. After the lower court decision in White Motor,
an FTC trial examiner in Sandura Co.53 condemned Sandura's distribu-
tion system employing territorial and customer limitations as illegal
per se. The FTC, sustaining the trial examiner's findings, held that
Sandura's distribution system violated section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act;M even though some aspects of Sandura's distribution
system may not have been anticompetitive per se, the system in its
entirety was anticompetitive since its cumulative effect was to restrain
competition.5 Sandura, a small manufacturer in the highly competitive
floor products industry, because of technical manufacturing difficulties,
decline of sales, and reluctance of dealers to handle Sandura's
products, had adopted a new distribution system. The new system
employed a closed territorial system at the distributor level and a
franchise system at the retail level, restricted distributors' sales to an
assigned area, and precluded dealers from purchasing from a distribu-
tor outside their area. Intra-distributor rivalries were discouraged and
border disputes were sometimes settled by elimination of a distributor.
Sandura also attempted to enforce a system of retail price mainte-
nance.
In attempting to sustain the legality of its distribution system,
Sandura alleged that competitive conditions in the industry and the
necessity of attracting new dealers with no prior business experience
able to make the heavy capital investment necessary to distribute a
new product necessitated the use of a closed territorial system.5 It
argued that rejection of 'this system would cause it to lose its energetic
dealers, thereby impairing rather than promoting competition in the
industry.
5 7
The FTC assumed arguendo that Sandura's argument of economic
justification-analogous to the failing company doctrine under section
7 of the Clayton Act 4-would apply to a section 5 case59 and rejected
it on three grounds: (1) Sandura was not a failing company; (2) there
was no causal connection between fiscal success and the distribution
system; and (3) there were no similar provisions in distribution
systems of Sandura's twenty competitors.60 This third ground implies
that practices of competitors in the industry, though not determina-
53. Sandura Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961-63 Trade Cas.) ff 15424 (FTC 1961).
54. TRADE REG. REP. (1961-63 Trade Cas.) ff 15945 (FTC 1962).
55. Id. at 20772-73.
56. Id. at 20763.
57. ibid.
58. International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
59. Sandura Co., supra note 53, at 20763-64.
60. Id. at 20764-65.
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rive, are relevant in assessing the legality of a challenged distribution
system.61
Because territorial limitations may have varying effects and may be
economically justified, the Supreme Court's realistic consideration of
the problem and its rejection of the per se approach in White Motor
is undoubtedly correct.0 An attempt to suggest specific economic
justifications for use of territorial limitations appears futile because of
the varying effects of these limitations in different industries under
different competitive conditions. The following considerations can be
said to be meaningful. Nature of the limitation. Since a territorial
limitation has different competitive effects according to the type of
limitation (exclusive selling, closed territory, geographical customer
allocations), the nature of the agreement is important; a closed terri-
torial system might be sustained when a geographical customer alloca-
tion system would fail. Competitive nature of the industry. In a highly
competitive industry, territorial limitations may have little, if any,
effect; however, the same limitation could be very restrictive in an
oligopolistic industry. Other factors are the relevant market4 and
61. "Doubtless, long-tolerated trade arrangements acquire no vested immunity under
the Sherman Act; no prescriptive rights accrue by the prosecutor's delay. . . . That
consideration, however, is not wholly irrelevant when monopolistic purpose rather
than effect remains to be gauged." Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 623-24 (1953).
62. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. The central inquiry in analyzing
exclusives is whether newcomers have entry into the market, irrespective of the
manufacturer's distribution system. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Motion Picture Adver-
tising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953); RE orT OF THE ATroRNEY CzaENmAji's
NATIONAL CoviTrEE TO SnDy THE ANITrUsT LAWS, 146-47 (1955).
The problem of exclusives has three competitive aspects: (1) the restraint imposed
on the parties themselves, (2) the impact of the agreement on competitors of the
buyer and/or seller, and (3) the effects on the consuming public. Essentially, this is
a process of balancing the interests affected by the exclusive arrangement. DAY, op.
cit. supra note 30; DmLrm & KAHN, FA i CoMTErrnoN: THE LAW AND ECONOafiCS
OF ANrrrausT PorIcy 141 (1954). See also Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of
Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3
of the Clayton Act, 65 HAav. L. REv. 913, 919-31 (1952).
"The prime question is whether the exclusive, i.e., the act is unreasonable, or stems
merely from socially acceptable methods of vying for customer patronage and from
the free decision of buyer and seller." DmL.m & Khnar, op. cit. supra note 62, at 118.
63. In economics, the term market has several meanings. DuDDY & REVZAN,
MAPJM=G 8-9 (1947); Vaile, Some Concepts of Markets and Marketing Strategy,
in CHANGING STRucURE iN MAmTNG-UNIvERsrTY OF ILLINOIs M KrnNo Syzm-
Posium 18-19 (1957). Legally, market is a judicial construct used to resolve three
problems under the antitrust laws: (1) whether competition exists between two or
more products; (2) whether a particular business organization or organizations have
monopoly power; and (3) whether a certain transaction has anti-competitive effects.
Note, 54 COLum. L. REv. 580 (1954). This concept is a tool of factual analysis. Id. at
603.
The nature of this concept does not permit a particularized definition of market for
all purposes; it will have to be defined for each individual case. Id. at 585. Professor
Handler says that "the essential issue in defining a market is the area of effective
the competitive position of the manufacturer employing the limitation,
i.e., whether it is a dominant producer, a new market entry, or a failing
company.
III. CUSTOMER LIMITATONS
When granting exclusive selling rights manufacturers frequently
reserve the right to sell directly to large accounts.6 Sometimes these
arrangements also prohibit the distributor or dealer from selling to
the "reserved" accounts.65 Such an arrangement was present in White
Motor-the dealers were prohibited from selling to governmental
units and other large consumers. The Supreme Court, without ex-
pressing any opinion on the validity of White's customer limitations,
held that it was not a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.66
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion argued that customer
limitations are inherently more dangerous than territorial limitations
because they "serve to suppress all competition between manufacturer
and distributors for the custom of the most desirable accounts" 67 and
"seem to lack any of the countervailing tendencies to foster competi-
tion between brands which may accompany the territorial limita-
tions."O In Justice Brennan's view,
The crucial question .. . is whether, in any meaningful sense, the dis-
tributors could, but for the restrictions, compete with the manufacturer for
the reserved outlets. If they could, but are prevented from doing so only
by the restrictions, then in the absence of some justification neither presented
nor suggested by this record, their invalidity would seem to be apparent.69
competition." Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 COLUM.
L. REv. 843, 853 (1959).
The market (relevant market as it is generally called) consists of a geographical
market and a products market. Macdonald, Product Competition in the Relevant
Market Under the Sherman Act, 53 MiCEr. L. REv. 69, 70-80 (1954). See HALE &
HALE, MARE POWER SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT § 3.7 (1958),
and Note, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 594-99 (1954), for factors in the analysis of the
geographic market. For discussions of the products market see HALE & HALE, op. cit.
supra § 3.4 (1958), and Note, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 585-92 (1954).
Macdonald has proposed the following test to determine the market. "[C]an the
average customer change without substantial difficulty from the product of the de-
fendant to the product claimed to be in the same market with that of the defendant?"
Macdonald, Product Competition in the Relevant Market Under the Sherman Act, 53
Micr. L. REv. 69, 82 (1954). See also REPORT OF T=E ATTORNEv GENERAL's NATIONAL
Comurrn To STUDY TnE ANT=ERUST LAWS 1, 44-48 (1955); Rostow, Problem of Size
and Integration in Business Practice Under Federal Antitrust Laws, 1951 ANTrrnUST L.
SYmwosIum N.Y.B.A. 117, 126.
64. See generally Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,
75 HARv. L. REV. 795, 817-23 (1962).
65. Id. at 817-19.
66. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
67. Id. at 272.
68. Ibid.
69. Id. at 272-73. For a case striking down a customer limitation arrangement see
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White Motor, attempting to justify the use of customer limitations,
argued that (1) distributors were not competent to handle the
intricate process of servicing large accounts;70 (2) "the only sure way
to make certain something really important is done right, is to do it
for oneself";71 and (3) these limitations are necessary to enable White
to more effectively compete with its competitors by direct selling.72
Justice Brennan rejected all three arguments.
7 3
Justice Brennan's summary dismissal of White's service argument is
unfortunate. Undoubtedly a manufacturer has a legitimate interest in
servicing, especially in the truck manufacturing industry, where
servicing may be the decisive factor in brand selection; the manufac-
turer should be entitled to protect this interest if a dealer cannot
adequately and effectively service large accounts. White's servicing
argument may be valid in reference to a dealer in a small community,
but it does not follow that the argument is equally valid when
applied to White's large dealers in the metropolitan areas of New
York and Chicago. Therefore, a court in assessing the merits of a
manufacturer's servicing argument should inquire into the servicing
facilities and capabilities of each dealer in the manufacturer's distribu-
tion system.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in sustaining Snap-On's
customer limitation, 4 examined all the instances where the restraint
was enforced and concluded that:
Reasoned analysis of each instance leads us to the conclusion that at most
a de minimis restraint on competition was involved and that the entire
record fails to afford a substantial basis for the implied finding of the
Commission that the practice was widespread, or an integral part of an
unlawfully restrictive dealer system.7 5
Prior to White Motor a long line of cases recognized the common
law right of a private manufacturer engaged in private enterprise to
exercise discretion in selecting the outlets of his distribution system.7 6
United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945). See
Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 795, at 817-19; Note, 41 ILL. L. R1v. 132 (1946); 14 Gro.
WAsh. L. REv. 531 (1946).
70. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 273-74 (1963).
71. Id. at 274.
72. Id. at 274-75.
73. Id. at 273-75.
74. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
75. Id. at 836. (Emphasis added.)
76. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1922);
Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd,
227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915). See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 159 n.32 (1963).
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The Supreme Court, in United States v. Colgate & Co.,77 recognized
this right in what has come to be known as the Colgate doctrine.78
Subsequently, the Colgate doctrine was clarified 79 and its validity
questioned. 0 Then in United States v. Parke Davis & Co.,8 1 the
Supreme Court stated:
When the manufacturer's actions . . go beyond mere announcement of
his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which
effect adherence to his resale prices, this countervailing consideration
[manufacturer's right to freely exercise his own independent descretion as
to those with whom he will deal] is not present and therefore he has put
together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act.a2
Whether the refusal-to-deal cases extend to customer limitations is an
open question. Generally these cases have involved price fixing con-
siderations, which may or may not be present in an exclusive selling
arrangement with customer limitations. Both situations are similar
in that the manufacturer, generally speaking, is limiting the dealer's
right of resale. The situations differ in that the manufacturer in the
refusal-to-deal cases is not selecting the ultimate consumer, only
those to whom he will sell. When utilizing customer limitations similar
to those in White Motor, the manufacturer is reserving certain ultimate
consumers for himself so that he may either skim "off the cream of
the trade for... [his] own direct sales,"83 or protect his reputation and
good will.8 4 Because of these differences and the different considera-
tions in analyzing each arrangement, the refusal-to-deal cases should
not be extended to customer limitations.
In summary, customer limitations-reservation of selected accounts
by the manufacturer-are not illegal per se; thus Justice Brennan's
suggested analysis of territorial limitations may be used to determine
the validity of customer limitations. 8s
77. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
78. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
[Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell." Id. at 307.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., supra note 76; Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra note 76.
80. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Htnv. L. RFv. 655, 684-91 (1962).
81. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
82. Id. at 44.
83. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 254, 274 (1963).
84. See Note, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 795, 830-31.
85. The following test has been suggested for determining the legality of customer
limitations: "Unless it can be said that the restraint will significantly diminish the
vitality of competition in the relevant market, it should be permitted as reasonably
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CONCLUSION
At present, the status of exclusive selling arrangements with terri-
torial and/or customer limitations is unsettled. Since these arrange-
ments are not illegal per se, a full trial is necessary to adjudge their
validity. Future courts, enlightened by the arguments of lawyers, the
analyses of commentators, and the testimony of numerous expert
witnesses, will be in a better position to formulate policies and estab-
lish guidelines in this area. Legislative proposals may be submitted
to Congress to eliminate this uncertainty. Hasty legislation in this area
would be unwise, however, for legislative experience in this area,
like judicial experience, is limited.
JACK R. HLUSTK
calculated to strengthen the hand of the manufacturer in competing with others."
Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CoRNLm L.Q.
254,274 (1960).
